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Interests and Structure in Dualist Social Theory:  
A Critical Appraisal of Archer’s Theoretical and Empirical Arguments 
By Stephen Kemp 
Email: s.kemp@ed.ac.uk 
 
Abstract: This article evaluates the structural conception of interests developed by 
Margaret Archer as part of her dualist version of critical realism.  It argues that this 
structural analysis of interests is untenable because (i) Archer’s account of the causal 
influence of interests on agents is contradictory; and (ii) Archer fails to offer a 
defensible account of her claim that interests influence agents by providing reasons 
for action.  These problems are explored in relation to Archer’s theoretical and 
empirical work.  I argue for an alternative account of interests that focuses on 
agents’ understandings of their interests and problems with these understandings. 
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1. Introduction 
In this article I will critically assess the arguments put forward by the important 
contemporary critical realist thinker Margaret Archer (1995, 2003, 2007) about the 
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place of interests in social analysis.  There are at least four good reasons to 
undertake the task of appraising Archer’s ideas on interests.  Firstly, Archer has come 
to be a prominent and well-referenced theorist, but little critical reflection has been 
directed at the place of interests in her mode of analysis, despite it being an 
important component of her work.  Secondly, evaluating Archer’s account of 
interests allows us to get critical purchase on her account of structure as well 
because of the connections that she draws between the two.  Thirdly, as Archer 
doesn’t just theorize interests but uses them in her empirical analyses, her work 
helps us to consider the benefits or otherwise of a critical realist analysis put into 
practice (Archer, 2003, 2007).  Fourthly, evaluating a form of interest analysis 
located within a prominent mode of social theorising helps us to reflect on the more 
general question of how the analysis of interests should be conducted in social 
science.   
 
Before getting into the details of Archer’s analysis it will be useful to situate her 
arguments further.  Archer is a key exponent of the philosophy of critical realism.  
Critical realism emerged initially out of criticism of positivist and idealist accounts of 
natural science, which were accused of failing to give the ‘reality’ of natural scientific 
objects an appropriate place in analysis (Bhaskar, 1975).  By contrast, the key early 
realist Roy Bhaskar argued that natural scientific objects are real entities that have 
the power to influence events because of their internal structure.  In arguing that 
questions about the nature of reality were legitimate ones, critical realists defended 
the value of ontological debate, that is, reasoned analysis of the fundamental 
building blocks of the natural and social worlds.  It is particularly in relation to the 
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latter that critical realists have offered extensive arguments (see for example 
Bhaskar, 1979; Sayer, 1992; Archer, 1995).  One important realist move has been to 
critique ‘reductionist’ positions which they see as failing to give appropriate 
consideration to the role of various ontological elements in generating the social 
world, including social structures, cultural structures, and agents (Bhaskar, 1979; 
Archer, 1995; Elder-Vass, 2010).  Critical realist arguments have often been framed 
as contributions to the structure/agency debate, with realists joining others in 
arguing that this division needs to be maintained and elaborated on rather than 
transcended (e.g. Mouzelis, 2000).  The division between structure and agency is 
important to understanding Archer’s analysis of interests because Archer sees 
interests as a feature of ‘objective social structure’, and as having a character and 
influence upon agents which is not reducible to agents’ own understandings.  As I 
will argue in the next section, Archer’s approach to interests is importantly different 
from subjectivist, constructionist and pragmatist accounts which do not see interests 
as ‘real’ properties of the social world that can be identified and justified 
independently of agents’ understandings.   
 
Because Archer’s analysis of interests is based in critical realist ontological 
arguments, the article is going to assess her claims in two contexts: in relation to 
debates about social ontology and in relation to social scientific analyses of the 
concept of interests.  The overall argument of the article will be that Archer fails to 
convincingly defend her realist account of interests, and I will also argue that a 
problem-solving (or pragmatist) alternative is preferable.  To criticize Archer’s 
approach, I will focus largely on Archer’s ontological arguments, contending: (i) that 
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Archer’s own treatment of interests as structural is inconsistent, and ends up 
undermining her insistence that structural interests necessarily have an influence on 
social life; (ii) that Archer is unable to sustain her claim that agents’ interests have a 
determinate character no matter what the goals and understandings of those agents 
are.  Having made these arguments I move, in the final section, to consider the 
significance of these points in relation to social scientific accounts of interests.  The 
key argument there is that Archer’s realist approach to interests should be rejected 
in favour of a pragmatist alternative which allows criticism of actors’ interest 
conceptions but insists on the need to locate and justify such criticism in relation to 
actors’ own understandings.  I also consider the consequences of the criticisms 
developed for debates about social structure, and I argue that the difficulties with 
Archer’s structural account of interests give support to those who criticise dualism 
and reject dualist notions of structure. 
 
2. The Analysis of Interests and Archer’s Ontology  
The first part of this section situates Archer’s analysis of interests in two ways: firstly, 
in relation to other social scientific theories of interests, and then in relation to the 
ontological ideas that are central to critical realism.  I then go on to describe how 
Archer applies her approach to interests in empirical research.  Starting with social 
scientific accounts of interests, I want to begin by agreeing with Steven Lukes’ view 
that when we refer to an outcome being ‘in the interests’ of actors, we are making a 
claim about which outcomes are beneficial for actors to realize (see Lukes, 2005: 37).  
Moving on from this point we can see that one useful way to classify theories of 
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interests1 is to distinguish approaches on the basis of their answers to a pair of 
questions: Can actors’ understandings of their interests be mistaken?  If so, how is 
this possible?   
 
The first answer to these questions that I want to consider is the view that although 
actors might be mistaken about how to realize their interests, they cannot be wrong 
about their interests as such.  On this approach, it is in the interests of actors to have 
their preferences realized, and these preferences cannot be wrong or misguided (for 
critical discussions see Benton, 1981; Lukes, 2005).  Actors may be mistaken about 
the strategic course of action that can satisfy their preferences, but their preference 
for one outcome rather than another cannot be adjudged to be misguided, as 
preferences are a purely subjective matter.  Thus this first approach to interests 
might be considered ‘subjectivist’ in character. 
 
A second type of approach to interests can be called ‘social constructionist’, insofar 
as it conceives of agents’ interests as constituted in meanings developed through a 
process of social interaction (Barnes, 1995; Woolgar, 1981; Wendt, 1999).  
Defenders of social constructionism take this insight in different directions in relation 
to the question of whether actors can be mistaken about their interests.  However, 
in my view, a consistent reading of social constructionism implies that actors cannot 
be shown to be mistaken about their interests.  To draw out further a point that 
Woolgar (1981) makes: if one takes seriously the social constructionist view that 
meanings are contingent, and construct a self-consistent and self-validating account 
                                                 
1
 For another approach to classifying interests see Mathiowetz (2008). 
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of the world (see for example Barnes, 1982), then it does not make sense to claim 
that actors can be ‘mistaken’ about their interests.  On this view, actors’ interest 
claims are part of the constitution of their world, and there are no cracks in this 
world of meaning that can be exploited to make a justified critique of these claims.  
 
Both the subjectivist and the social constructionist account of interests imply that 
actors’ evaluations or preferences about what is a desirable outcome for them 
cannot be subject to justified critique.  By contrast, the third and fourth approaches I 
want to consider here suggest that actors’ interest-beliefs can be justifiably 
critiqued.  Defenders of the third account, which can be described as a ‘problem-
solving’ or ‘pragmatist’ account, argue that actors might be pursuing preferences 
and values that are not beneficial to them, are not in their interests to realize (see 
Ron, 2008; Holmwood, 1996).  This, of course, raises the question of how such a 
critical perspective can be justified.  Unlike constructionists, problem-solving 
theorists believe that actors’ understandings are rarely, if ever, self-consistent and 
self-validating.  As such, they see themselves as able to identify problems and 
limitations of actors’ beliefs, and put forward evidentially-justified but fallible 
arguments about the values and preferences it would be better for agents to 
attempt to realize.  Problem-solving theorists suggest that a reasoned dialogue 
about interests is possible in which agents might be persuaded to change the values 
and preferences they are attempting to realize, having been exposed to arguments 
about what is problematic about their current values and preferences.  Whether 
such arguments can ever be justified is certainly an issue for defenders of the 
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problem-solving approach, and I will discuss this further in the final section of the 
article. 
 
The final approach to interests that I want to mention is put forward by those who 
are rather more forthright about the possibility of agent-error, and Archer’s work 
falls into this category.  On this ‘realist’ view, agents’ preferences and evaluations 
about what is in their interests might be incorrect insofar as they do not map on to 
their ‘real’ or ‘objective’ interests.  This view has associations with Marxist traditions 
of thought (cf Balbus, 1971), but a well-known formulation which is less tightly linked 
to these traditions is that of Lukes (2005).  Whatever the differences of Archer’s 
approach to Marxist thought, the claim that agents may misrecognize the interests 
that inhere in their ‘objective’ structural positions places her in this realist camp.  
When characterising this realist approach to interests it is relevant to note a division 
within it.  On one side of the division are those, such as Lukes, who do not treat real 
interests as causal influences on behaviour in themselves, but as only influencing 
actors if they are recognized by those actors and incorporated into their framework 
for action.  Indeed, this is crucial to Lukes’ argument because he is interested in 
analysing the way in which power stops actors from pursuing their real interests, 
that is, from being influenced by them instead of by misconceptions (Lukes, 2005: 
37-8).  On the other side of the division are those who treat real interests as a causal 
influence on the behaviour of actors (for discussion see Hindess, 1986).  Archer’s 
approach falls into the latter camp, in that she sees the structurally-based interests 
of actors as having their own causal influence on what happens in the social world.  
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In the remainder of this section I want to consider how Archer uses critical realist 
arguments to justify her emphasis on the reality and causal influence of interests. 
 
It is not quite precise enough to label Archer a critical realist thinker because, like 
other schools of thought, critical realism is not unitary in character, and proponents 
are divided between those who see social structures as existing at any time only 
because of contemporaneous human activity and conceptualizations (see Outhwaite, 
1987: Manicas, 2005) and those who argue for a clear dualistic division between 
structure and agency (see Porpora, 1987; Creaven, 2000).   Archer is in the second 
camp, and makes a clear distinction between structure and agency, arguing that 
social structures have a reality and causal power that is, at any particular point in 
time, independent of the activities and understandings of actors in the social world 
(Archer, 1995).  Archer refers to her approach as ‘analytical dualism’, arguing that 
events in the social world are influenced by objective social and cultural structures, 
on the one hand, and subjective agents, on the other (Archer, 1995; see also 
Porpora, 1993).2  Archer places interests on the structural side of this dualism, seeing 
them as a feature of ‘objective social structure’ that exercises an influence on, but 
does not determine, what happens in the social world.  
 
To understand Archer’s argument that interests are structural in character, we need 
to explore further what critical realists mean when they say that structures have a 
reality and causal power.  Following Bhaskar, entities like social structures are 
                                                 
2
 To say that Archer’s position is dualist is not to deny that she upholds the view that a rich array of 
ontological elements are at play in the social and natural worlds.  Rather it is to characterise her 
position as arguing that one important dynamic in the social world is between two different elements, 
structure and agency.   
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understood to have an internal configuration that gives them the causal power to 
influence events that occur (Bhaskar, 1975).  The term ‘influence’ rather than 
‘determine’ is worth highlighting here, as realists argue that events that occur may 
be produced by the interaction of more than one structure, that is, influence.  For 
dualists such as Archer, social structures are entities which have the ‘emergent 
property’ of being able to exercise a causal influence upon social events (Archer, 
1995: 174).  At any given time they have the power to exercise an influence in a way 
that is ‘not dependent upon current activities nor influential because of their 
contemporary conceptualization’ (Archer, 1995: 148).  The need to emphasize that 
this independence is ‘present-day’ arises because Archer sees actors as being able to 
reconstruct structures through their activities, meaning that the future causal power 
of a structure is potentially shaped by contemporary action.  Importantly, as we will 
see, Archer argues that the causal influence of social structures operates through 
‘conditioning’ what agents can pursue; structures condition ‘different courses of 
action for those differently placed, by supplying different reasons to them’ (Archer, 
1995: 201).  As to what exactly a social structure looks like, Archer offers an account 
of three types of structure – positional structures, roles, and institutions (Archer, 
1995: 185-8).  For our purposes, the most important of these is positional structure, 
which is a set of differentiated locations in society’s distribution of resources, some 
locations being advantaged and others being disadvantaged (Archer, 1995: 185-188). 
 
As we would expect from a thinker with dualist commitments, Archer also wishes to 
give agency an important role.  Archer argues that agents have subjectively-based 
values, the most important of these being their ultimate concerns, which shape the 
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projects that they pursue (Archer, 2003: 141-143).  It is only in relation to these 
concerns that structures have an impact: 
 
‘…our subjectively defined concerns, and especially our ultimate concerns, 
act as a sounding board for our reception of and response to the objective 
situations that we confront.  Situations do not directly impact upon us…’ 
(Archer, 2003: 139) 
 
Archer also argues for the reflexivity and creativity of agents, their ability to reflect 
on structural conditions, and the possibility that they will respond creatively to these 
conditions.  Archer contends that by reflecting on structures and responding 
creatively to them ‘[c]onditional influences may be agentially evaded, endorsed, 
repudiated or contravened’ (Archer, 2003: 131). 
 
It is within this dualist framework that we can position Archer’s account of interests.   
As mentioned above, Archer’s analysis of interests places them on the ‘objective’ 
side of the divide between objective structure and subjective agency.  In this article I 
want to draw together under the category ‘structural interests’ both what Archer 
refers to as ‘vested interests’ and those situational prompts which provide objective 
rewards or penalties.  It will be easier to justify this move once I have explained 
Archer’s approach to both elements.  Archer’s analysis of vested interests is laid out 
in Realist Social Theory (1995).  In this work, Archer doesn’t directly define what she 
takes an interest to be, but reconstructing her arguments we might state the 
following: positions in social structure have either objective benefits or costs 
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inherent in them.  Where there are objective benefits, the position supplies 
occupants with a vested interest in behaviour that protects these benefits; where 
there are objective costs, occupants of the position have a vested interest in 
changing their social position to avoid these (Archer, 1995: 203-9).  Perhaps more 
unusually, Archer argues that: 
 
‘agents’ vested interests are objective features of their situations which, it 
will be maintained, then predispose them to different courses of action and 
even towards different life courses’ (Archer, 1995: 203) 
 
In other words, Archer here presents structural interests as ‘out there’ in social 
structure, encouraging agents to act in certain ways. 
 
For Archer the basis of vested interests is in scarce resources; however, interests are 
not promoted by increasing the absolute level of such resources owned but are 
‘concerned with relative advantages’ (Archer, 1995: 204).  A standard example 
offered by Archer is that those who are born into a situation of social privilege have 
a vested interest in maintaining the status quo, and thus maintaining their (relative) 
wealth; whereas those who are born into a disadvantaged family have a vested 
interest in changing their social position (or indeed the structure of social positions 
more generally) (Archer, 1995: 185).  
 
The other aspect of Archer’s analysis that I want to draw under the category of 
‘structural interests’ emerges more clearly in Structure, Agency and the Internal 
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Conversation (2003).  From this book onwards, Archer largely focuses on social 
mobility, suggesting that moves up the socio-economic scale bring objective 
rewards/bonuses to actors, and moves down the socio-economic scale bring 
objective penalties (see for example, Archer, 2003: 185; Archer, 2007: 191).  These 
come to be treated independently of whether such a move takes the individual out 
of the bottom half of the wealth distribution and into the top half, or vice versa (see 
for example Archer, 2007: 192).  Although Archer doesn’t use the language of 
interests to describe them, the concepts of objective rewards and penalties are 
clearly used in analogous ways to ‘vested interests’.  Crucially, as with vested 
interests, these are structural aspects which provide a reason for actors to act in 
certain ways, to pursue rewards, and to avoid penalties.  Thus I would argue that it is 
reasonable to include these structural and situational prompts, as well as ‘vested 
interests’, under the category of ‘structural interests’.  In all cases, Archer’s analysis 
suggests that the structural position and circumstances of actors gives them a reason 
to act in one way rather than another.   
 
Of course, given that Archer argues for the importance of incorporating both 
structure and agency into analyses we need to consider how she sees structural 
interests as relating to the thoughts and decisions of agents.  As we might expect, 
Archer wants to see interests as conditioning, but not determining, the actions of 
agents (Archer, 1995: 205).  This conditioning comes about because objective costs 
accrue to actors if they fail to promote their structural interests.  For example, if a 
wealthy person decides to give away all of their money to charity then they face the 
cost of losing their privilege in society’s distribution of resources.  Archer argues that 
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this doesn’t mean that no-one will ever engage in such an action.  But it does mean 
that they pay an objective price if they do so (Archer, 1995: 205-8). 
 
Once we gather together Archer’s accounts of vested interests and of objective 
rewards and penalties under the category of structural interests we can see that the 
analysis of such interests is crucial to her overall project.  Interests are one of the 
central ways in which social structures are understood to exercise an influence on 
agents, and, in Archer’s later work, much of the discussion is about how agents 
respond to these structured opportunities and disadvantages (Archer, 2003, 2007).  
Indeed, although Archer argued in Realist Social Theory (1995) that roles and 
institutions are key aspects of social structure, these barely feature in her later work, 
whereas frequent reference is made to the way in which social structure provides 
objective rewards or penalties to situated agents. 
 
To see the place that Archer gives structural interests in practice, we can consider 
the extended empirical analyses developed in Structure, Agency and the Internal 
Conversation (2003) and Making Our Way through the World (2007).  These works 
pursue the laudable goal of combining ontological theorizing with empirical 
analysis.3   The theoretical parts of these works are dedicated to developing an 
account of reflexivity that pays particular attention to the ‘internal conversation’, a 
form of reflection which Archer sees as mediating between agents and their social 
                                                 
3 That Archer’s later work attempts to connect theory and research should have been acknowledged 
in Kemp (2005). 
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circumstances.4  The empirical parts of the works introduce and explore a typology 
of different kinds of reflexivity which Archer developed centrally through qualitative 
interviewing, although this was supplemented in the later work by questionnaire-
based research.  On the basis of the interviews undertaken in Structure, Agency and 
the Internal Conversation, Archer argued that she had discovered three functional 
types of reflexivity – communicative, autonomous and meta – and one type of 
thinking in which reflexivity is limited more or less severely - fractured.   Archer’s 
view of the adequacy of this typology was broadly reinforced by the interview and 
questionnaire research on which Making Our Way through the World is based, 
although she does tweak aspects of her earlier analysis.  For example, Archer comes 
to argue that individuals call on a range of forms of reflexivity in their lives.  
However, she also contends that we can usually classify individuals into one category 
by identifying which is the dominant mode of reflexivity that they exercise (Archer, 
2007: 94).  Although Archer presents a range of stimulating data and analyses, what 
is relevant to us here is the way that she calls on structural interests in analysing her 
interview data.  Space precludes me from discussing how this works in all four of 
Archer’s categories of reflexives, so I will focus here on communicative reflexives.  
Even with this restriction, I will only be able to offer a brief discussion of a much 
richer analysis. 
 
Communicative reflexives, as may be apparent from the name, do not engage in 
lengthy solitary reflection on the issues that they face, such as questions of what 
                                                 
4
 Archer’s arguments about the character of the ‘internal conversation’ are undoubtedly worthy of 
serious theoretical attention.  However, given the focus of this article on interests, I will not be 
considering them here. 
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educational trajectory to follow, what form of employment to seek, and where to 
live.  Rather, they prefer to discuss them with others, particularly friends and family, 
not trusting their own thoughts.  According to Archer, the typical result of this 
tendency is that ‘proposed courses of action are reduced to more modest 
proportions’ (Archer, 2007: 166).  Archer suggests that communicative reflexives 
‘actively reduce their ambitions’ and have a tendency towards ‘waiting upon 
contingency’ that results from their inclination to share any plans they have with 
familiar others in the local context (Archer, 2007: 165-6).  Intertwined with a reliance 
on friends and family as partners to reflect on their life courses is the strong value 
placed on such relationships by communicative reflexives (Archer, 2003: 169).  
Although Archer reports that many of the individuals across different groups of 
reflexives nominate family as being of great importance to them, she also contends 
that communicative reflexives have a qualitative commitment to family that is 
stronger than those who do not share this as a dominant mode of reflexivity (Archer, 
2007: 279).  Thus, as agents, the ultimate concern that shapes their projects is to 
promote and protect the quality of their relations with friends and (especially) 
family. 
 
For our purposes here, the crucial aspect of Archer’s account is her analysis of the 
structural interests of communicative reflexives and their response to these putative 
interests.  In essence, Archer argues that communicative reflexives act in a way 
which does not promote their structural interests.  Archer suggests that where 
opportunities present themselves, communicative reflexives could achieve a ‘wholly 
objective bonus’ by successfully engaging in projects to achieve upward social 
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mobility (Archer, 2003: 184-5).  And in some cases, Archer suggests that 
communicative reflexives have been presented with such possibilities.  However, she 
argues that, as a result of the exercise of their agency, communicative reflexives 
generally do not pursue their structural interests, and instead ‘actively shun 
objective enablements to social advancement’ (Archer, 2003: 350, 198-9).  The 
reason why communicative reflexives do not pursue their structural interests, 
according to Archer, is because they are subjectively committed to the priority of 
family and friends in their lives.  On Archer’s interpretation, communicative 
reflexives believe that if they commit too much time to work, or indeed any other 
pursuit, relations with family and friends will suffer.  Thus their interpretations and 
priorities as agents lead them to act against their putative interests.  Having outlined 
Archer’s position at some length, I now want to turn to critically evaluating it. 
 
3. Criticising Archer’s Account of Structural Interests 
In this section I want to engage critically with Archer’s work by identifying two 
important, and interrelated, problems with her arguments.  The first is a 
contradiction between Archer’s insistence on the important causal influence that 
interests have, and her argument that interests may have no influence whatsoever 
on what actors do.  The second problem is that Archer’s account of interests as 
structures independent of agents’ understandings cannot be upheld. 
 
Interests as causal influences that may not influence 
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We have seen already that Archer makes quite strong claims about the impact of 
structural interests on actors.  For Archer, vested interests are the way in which 
positions in social structure influence people, and of such positions, Archer states: 
 
‘…those which are acquired involuntaristically profoundly affect both what is 
sought and what can be achieved through even the most heroic acts of 
voluntarism’ (Archer, 1995: 203) 
 
So here Archer is stating that positions that actors haven’t chosen, and the structural 
interests that inhere within them, ‘profoundly affect’ what they seek, an even 
stronger statement than the earlier cited remark that interests ‘predispose’ actors to 
different courses of action.  These are bold words.  However, I would argue that both 
theoretically and in her empirical accounts, Archer undermines these claims. 
 
This undermining is apparent, theoretically, in Archer’s discussion of the objective 
costs and penalties on action.  As we have seen, Archer argues that the interests 
inherent in structural positions make certain courses of action less attractive 
because of the objective costs associated with them.  Archer argues that such 
structural conditioning should be understood as ‘a supply of reasons for action’, 
contrasting the emphasis on ‘reasons’ with the idea that structures should be 
understood as ‘forces’ (Archer, 1995: 209).  Despite this contrast, Archer initially 
argues for the force of these reasons on all actors, stating: 
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‘…as they [actors] weigh them in the balance, [objective] costs and penalties 
tip the scales in one direction, meaning that countervailing concerns would 
have to be strong enough to outweigh them.’ (Archer, 1995: 209) 
 
Here, Archer is suggesting that structural costs and penalties have an intrinsic 
influence on all agents’ decision-making by tipping the scales one way, no matter 
what their subjective priorities are.  The reference to the possibility of countervailing 
concerns makes it sound as if Archer is arguing that the influence of structure may or 
may not be counterbalanced by the influence of agency. 
 
However, Archer also implies that agents can fully suspend the structural influences 
in question, stating: 
 
‘It is agents alone who do the weighing, who assign values to the weights of 
incommensurables…’  (Archer, 1995: 209) 
 
The implication of this argument is that objective costs and penalties do not 
necessarily ‘tip the scales in one direction’ for all actors.  After all, if agents are 
assigning ‘values to the weights’ then the ‘objective’ weights that Archer presents as 
tipping the scales may be assigned a tiny or null value by agents.  On the basis of 
Archer’s own claims, then, it is quite plausible to find that actors will treat structural 
reasons as weighing nothing, as having no weight.  This would occur, for example, 
when actors have no subjectively defined concern with ‘improving their lot’ through 
social mobility, and thus find the reasons supposedly provided by their social 
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structural interests to be irrelevant to their concerns, as not influencing them in the 
slightest.   
 
This interpretation of Archer’s views is backed up by her claim about structurally-
supplied reasons that ‘as with any reason, agents have to find it good’ (Archer, 1995: 
209).  It is surely the case that if agents do not find a reason good, they can simply 
ignore it in their deliberations, allowing it to have no influence on them.  As such, 
Archer here undermines the idea that structural interests would necessarily be 
expected to exercise some influence on what actors do.  Archer tacitly consents to 
the undermining of her claims about the influence of structural interests in those 
moments where she emphasizes the subjective basis of agents’ values. 
  
Archer’s treatment of interests in her empirical work similarly undermines her bolder 
claims about the influence of structural interests.  For example, in her analysis of the 
three types of healthy reflexive thinkers, we can see that, for Archer, only members 
of one of the three groups, the autonomous reflexives, are actually motivated to act 
in the way that Archer sees as consistent with their structural interests (Archer, 
2003: 349-351).  And when it comes to communicative reflexives, Archer certainly 
presents little or no evidence of their postulated structural interests ‘predisposing’ 
them towards seeking social mobility, let alone profoundly affecting what they seek 
after.  She comes to argue the following about social structural influences: 
 
‘In fact, there is only a negative story to tell about the encounter between 
communicative reflexives and constraints or enablements, precisely because 
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the former systematically evade the latter over their life courses.  In 
completing the sequence <concerns → projects → practices>, these subjects 
conceive of no occupational projects that activate either the constraints or 
enablements associated with the employment structure.’ (Archer, 2007: 191. 
Archer’s emphasis) 
 
Thus the supposed interests of communicative reflexives have no influence on them.  
In making this kind of argument, Archer strongly undermines her former claim that 
structural interests exercise a general causal influence. 
 
Critical realists tend to think that the kind of criticism I have put to Archer’s approach 
can be defused by reference to a non-Humean account of causal relations in which 
causes influence actual outcomes rather than determining them.  On this 
interpretation, Archer would be taken as saying that the objective structure of 
interests influences what Communicative Reflexives seek to do, predisposing them in 
certain ways, but does not determine it.  Such a response would have two 
weaknesses.  Firstly, Archer does not give any indication that communicative 
reflexives have been predisposed (influenced) towards social mobility but have 
wrestled themselves round to an alternative set of values.  Secondly, and more 
fundamentally, Archer’s own presentation is very clear: communicative reflexives are 
not predisposed towards a particular direction of action by their structural interests 
because they evade them.  Thus Archer’s analysis does not actually present the 
situation as one of dual causal influence.  Rather, on Archer’s account, it is the 
agential causal powers of communicative reflexives that explain the projects that are 
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undertaken and valued.  And this is not a quirk of her empirical analysis – as 
mentioned above, the theoretical grounds for this are laid out in Archer’s arguments 
about agency and the process of agential weighing of courses of action.  Thus 
Archer’s theoretical account of structural interests allows that agents may give 
structural interests no weight.  As Archer analyses the situation, we do not 
necessarily have two causal influences; rather, in certain circumstances, the agent 
can render the structural interests entirely non-influential. 
 
This problem with Archer’s analysis reflects wider issues with dualist analyses that 
have been identified by John Holmwood and Alexander Stewart (1991).  Holmwood 
and Stewart argue that dualist approaches typically attempt to combine into one 
framework two elements which are defined in a way which precludes their 
combination into a consistent whole.  On the one hand, dualists want to include 
structural elements which are argued to delimit possibilities for action in a way 
which applies to all actors.  On the other hand, dualists want to include agency into 
their framework, which is understood to involve the creative or reflexive ability to 
cancel out, and thus act inconsistently with, structural inputs.  As Holmwood and 
Stewart point out, given these elements it is hardly surprising that dualists get into 
difficulties with their understanding of structure: it is required to be both a 
determinate influence on all action and, in cases where agency is exercised, to not 
be a determinate influence.  The result is that ‘the category of structure fails as an 
explanation of all the behaviours to which it should apply’ (Holmwood and Stewart, 
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1991: 89).5  Strikingly, Holmwood and Stewart’s work was published prior to the 
works of Archer discussed here, and yet, because the structure of her thought is a 
dualist one, their critique is applicable and insightful. 
 
Structural interests cannot provide reasons by themselves. 
This first criticism indicates that Archer’s own emphasis on the role of agents’ values 
in social life undermines her claims about the influence of structural interests on 
what they seek to do.  The second, related, criticism I want to make questions 
Archer’s approach further by criticising her idea that structural interests, operating 
as causal influences, can be identified separately from agents’ goals and 
understandings.  We have seen that, for Archer, the structure of interests operates 
as a causal influence by providing ‘reasons’ to agents (Archer, 1995: 201).  Archer’s 
discussion of what she means by this is limited.  But if we look at the way Archer 
uses the term, it is apparent that she sees reasons as positive motivating factors, 
which provide a stimulus for agents to act in one way rather than another.  Thus, for 
Archer, structural interests provide reasons for action insofar as social structural 
conditions provide a positive motivating factor influencing agents to take a particular 
direction of action.  For example, Archer would see the structural interest inherent in 
a privileged place in the distribution of wealth as a factor that positively motivates 
an actor to engage in strategies to maintain the status quo.  For ease of discussion, I 
will refer to a structural configuration with interests inherent in it as a ‘situation’. 
  
                                                 
5
 In relation to a critical realist approach, the point would have to be slightly reformulated to say that 
the category of structure fails to contribute to the explanation of all the behaviours to which it should 
apply. 
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To my mind, Archer’s account hits two difficulties.  The first of these arises from the 
role that agents’ understandings play in motivating their actions.  The point here is 
that the situation that an agent faces does not seem to have a direct motivating role; 
rather it is only agents’ understandings of this situation that can motivate their 
action.6  It might be the case that Bob is likely to get promoted if he plays golf with 
senior managers; but this state of affairs doesn’t, in itself, provide motivation to Bob.  
It is only if he understands it right (and has the necessary goals, see below) that this 
situation provides a positive motivating factor.  If Bob believes that playing golf with 
senior managers will actually harm his promotion chances, then the situational 
opportunity will not be motivating for him, and thus will not have a causal influence 
on him.  Archer seems to allow for this kind of possibility when she states that agents 
can fail to recognize their interests (Archer, 1995: 206).  But she does not work this 
through to see that situations and the structural interests supposed to be inherent in 
them cannot, therefore, directly provide reasons, and motivation, to agents.  It is, 
rather, an agent’s understanding of a situation that can be part of the motivation for 
action.7  Thus, structural interests, as Archer characterizes them, cannot be a direct 
causal influence on the formation of agents’ projects. 
 
The second difficulty arises from the fact that Archer wishes to treat the 
characteristics of certain structural situations as a ‘positive motivating factor’ 
                                                 
6
 This argument has analogies with Barry Hindess’s point that interests should be understood as 
conceptions, rather than as determined by their social location (Hindess, 1986). 
7
 Realists might argue that the entity itself has a part to play in belief formation; that the situational 
chance for self-promotion plays a part in forming an individual’s beliefs about the situation.  I would 
accept that point, but one would have to be a direct realist to claim that situations  impress their 
properties on agents in an unmediated way.  More plausible is the claim that agents interact with 
situations (or learn from the interactions of others) and form theoretically mediated and fallible 
beliefs about them.  And this doesn’t permit the direct supplying of reasons from social structure to 
actor. 
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independently of the goals of the agent.  But it seems much more plausible to argue 
that whether or not a situation is a ‘positive motivating factor’ depends on the goals 
of the agent.  Let’s take an example that relates closely to Archer’s concerns.  
Imagine that Jane is trying to decide whether or not to go to university.  
Incorporating the correction required by the first criticism, the Archer-style claim 
would be: because Jane believes that going to university will promote social mobility 
this provides a reason (positive motivation) for Jane to go to university.  However, I 
would argue that neither the situation in itself, nor the agent’s belief about the 
character of the situation, tells us whether or not it is positively motivating.  It is only 
when beliefs about the situation are combined with certain goals that the result is 
positive motivation to act.  So it would only be if Jane had the project of promoting 
her social mobility that her beliefs about university study would give her a reason to 
attend.  If Jane didn’t want to be socially mobile, her beliefs about the university’s 
capacities wouldn’t be a reason for her to attend. 
 
How serious are these difficulties for the cogency of Archer’s approach?  I would 
argue that both points undermine Archer’s attempt to characterise the causal 
influence of structural interests as reasons.  Firstly, such influences become indirect 
– it is not the structural situation itself that exercises an influence on what agents do, 
it is their understanding of it.  Secondly, whereas Archer wishes to characterize 
structurally-based interests as reasons that are independent of agents’ goals and 
values, this cannot be done.  There are no goal-independent reasons; only goal-
dependent ones.  As Archer argues, goals are pursued because of their contribution 
to realizing the values of an agent.  This means that structurally-based interests only 
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provide positive motivation to act in a certain way when they are consistent with a 
particular goal and a value-commitment that requires that goal for its realization.  
These arguments push the initial criticism of Archer’s approach, offered above, even 
further.  The earlier argument was that Archer allows that agents may ignore the 
reasons that derive from structural interest structures entirely.  This argument 
suggests that Archer cannot even characterize these structural interests 
independently of an understanding of agents’ goals and values. 
 
4.  Conclusion: Towards an Alternative Analysis 
If these criticisms stand, Archer’s analysis of interests as structural causes looks 
seriously problematic.  As I have suggested throughout this article, Archer’s account 
of interests is fundamentally linked to her dualist ontological arguments, and in this 
concluding section I want to briefly consider the wider ramifications of these 
criticisms for Archer’s dualist approach.  In doing so I will be considering the 
consequences of the earlier critique for Archer’s defence of the notion that structure 
has an existence, character and causal influence that is independent of the 
understandings of agents.  Secondly, I want to give some indication of what I would 
consider to be a preferable alternative approach to the social scientific analysis of 
interests. 
 
Starting with the issue of structure, I suggested in the previous section that Archer’s 
account of structural interests is not consistent with her claims about the 
independent causal influence and character of structural elements.  Archer allows 
that structural interests may have no influence whatsoever if agents’ subjective 
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values do not make them relevant.  The generality of Archer’s views on agency 
suggest that any structural element may have no influence on the social world, as is 
apparent in Archer’s already cited remark that: 
 
‘[c]onditional influences may be agentially evaded, endorsed, repudiated or 
contravened’ (Archer, 2003: 131). 
 
This remark strongly implies that the conditioning influence of structure can be 
entirely irrelevant to agents because they can evade it or even repudiate it, that is, 
simply refuse to recognize this ‘influence’ or have any dealings with it.  As Archer’s 
argument implies that the influence of any structural element, including roles and 
institutions, may be repudiated by actors, it is hard for Archer to evade Holmwood 
and Stewart’s critique that the concept of structural influence in dualist thought is 
undermined by the role given to agency (Holmwood, and Stewart, 1991).   
 
In my view, aspects of the second criticism that I offered of Archer’s account of 
structural interests can be similarly generalized to other elements of her structural 
account.  Archer sees roles and institutions as operating through a conditioning 
influence on what agents do.  However, as with structured interests, it is hard to see 
how this influence can have a determinate character and shape independent of 
agents’ understandings.  The way Archer conceptualizes the matter, it is as if all 
agents at a particular time are influenced by a role to share a single conception of 
that role, which they might then decide to diverge from in various agential ways (see 
Archer, 1995: 186-8) .  However, it is not clear how this first step occurs: how the 
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single conception of the role is embedded into and unified across the minds of 
agents at a particular point in time before they decide how to respond agentially to 
it.   
 
These remarks offer some sense of how the criticisms offered in the previous section 
of the article can be expanded to question Archer’s wider analysis of structure.  But I 
want to finish here with some more positive thoughts on how an alternative analysis 
of interests might proceed.  Instead of social scientists treating interests as ‘real’ and 
as having a causal influence on actors, I want to recommend that social scientists 
focus both on actors’ understandings of their interests and the potential limitations 
of these understandings.  This orientation is consistent with my emphasis on the 
importance of actors’ understandings and goals in analysing interests, and would 
involve trying to grasp which outcomes actors see as promoting their interests, as 
beneficial to them, and which they see as contrary to their interests.  One immediate 
consequence of taking this point of view is that it encourages social scientists to 
consider a wider range of outcomes as potentially ‘in the interests’ of actors than 
those identified by Archer.  Thus, it may be that agents see it as in their interests, as 
beneficial to them, to maintain strong social relationships.  Such identifications need 
to be taken seriously by social scientists. 
 
As I have already implied, however, giving attention to agents’ understandings of 
their interests does not require that these understandings are uncritically accepted.  
Thus, although agents’ understandings of their interests are being given an 
important role here, I want to advocate a problem-solving/pragmatist approach 
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rather than a constructionist view, and retain the idea that criticism of agents’ 
interest accounts can be justified (see Holmwood, 1996; Ron, 2008).  On this 
approach, social scientists can assess agents’ interest accounts for problems and 
inconsistencies, and, if these can be identified, social scientists can propose 
alternative accounts which are justified insofar as they resolve these problems.  
These problems and inconsistencies can be found either in agents’ understandings of 
which courses of action will further their goals or in agents’ understandings of which 
goals are best for them.  The first of these is a fairly familiar instrumental mode of 
critique which could be accepted even by those defending a subjectivist account of 
interests.  An agent might believe that last-minute intensive cramming is the best 
way to prepare for an exam and achieve their goal of gaining entry to university.  By 
contrast, the social scientist may be able to indicate the problematic memory-
outcomes that result from cramming, and put forward a persuasive case that a 
longer period of less intensive work is likely to produce results which will promote 
the agent’s goal more successfully.  However, as noted in Section 2, this mode of 
critique is limited to addressing agents’ understandings of how to realize their 
interests, rather than offering an assessment of their interests per se. 
 
The second type of critique suggests that the evaluations by agents of the outcomes 
it is in their interests to pursue may be problematic and subject to justified criticism.  
This is the more fundamental mode of critique for distinguishing interest theories, 
because neither subjectivist nor consistently constructionist accounts permit this 
mode.  However, there are social scientific precedents for it.  For example, one way 
to interpret aspects of Betty Friedan’s The Feminine Mystique (1963) is to take it as 
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identifying problematic conceptions of interests which identified the appropriate 
goal for American women in the 1950s to be that of a provider of care for husbands, 
children and sofas (among other things).  Friedan argues that pursuing this goal 
generated difficulties for women – the malaise and depression which Friedan 
famously referred to as the ‘problem with no name’ – and should be replaced with a 
goal of self-realization in which women utilize their full capacities by contributing to 
meaningful work in the public sphere.  Although much more could be said about this 
kind of case, it does suggest the possibility of identifying problems with agents’ 
goals, their conception of what it is in their interests to achieve, and giving a justified 
critique of them.   
 
One advantage of the problem-solving approach that I am advocating is that it 
discourages social scientific analysts from imposing an account of interests on agents 
which implies that these agents are acting against their own interests despite no 
problematic outcomes being identified for them.  In my view, such impositions are 
an unintended consequence of Archer’s approach and this is most clear, again, in her 
treatment of communicative reflexives.  In Making Our Way Through the World 
Archer argues that communicative reflexives are oriented in their lives towards self-
sacrifice and self-abnegation (Archer, 2007: 97, 175, 178-9).  A central reason for this 
characterisation is Archer’s contention that throughout their lives communicative 
reflexives cut down their occupational projects to promote their concern with their 
families (Archer, 2007: 175).  Read through the lens of Archer’s interest account the 
decisions and action of communicative reflexives may seem to be sacrificial.  But 
Archer admits that communicative reflexives do not see things this way: 
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‘…although fully self-aware about what they have objectively 
foregone…subjectively they will not entertain this as sacrificial action – 
because they believe that the outcome has been beneficial and resulted in 
all-round contentment.’  (Archer, 2007: 175) 
 
In my view, Archer’s attribution of a sacrificial orientation despite the denials of 
communicative reflexives is a product of her imposition of a narrow view of 
interests.  If we take the agents’ understandings of their interests seriously, we can 
see that the actions communicative reflexives take are oriented to realizing the 
outcomes that they value, close family and friendship relations, rather than being 
sacrificial in character.8  
 
It is worth being clear that it is not the very idea that agents may not be acting in 
their interests that I am rejecting.  As I have suggested, the problem-solving 
approach recommended as an alternative does not argue that actors’ views of their 
interests must be accepted on their own terms.  However, it does suggest that to 
legitimately contest these accounts it must be possible to identify problems and 
inconsistencies for actors on their own terms, and this is what Archer does not do 
with communicative reflexives.  There are some possibilities in the case just 
considered that a pragmatist social critic could explore: perhaps communicative 
                                                 
8
 To try to clarify this point: I am not suggesting that Archer sees no value in inter-personal 
relationships.  Rather, what I am suggesting is that her analytical apparatus does not permit her to 
identify the pursuit of relations with friends and family as in the interests of Communicative 
Reflexives.  Rather, her mode of analysis pushes Archer to see such a pursuit as involving a ‘sacrificial’ 
orientation on their part, despite what the actors actually report.   
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reflexives are pursuing a goal that is not best for them (although they generally 
report being contented, as Archer notes in the quote above); perhaps they could 
have achieved social mobility without jeopardising family and friendship relations; 
or, more fundamentally, perhaps it is in the interests of communicative reflexives to 
promote social change such that they can experience positive relations with friends 
and family without this resulting in social disadvantage.  However, from a problem-
solving perspective, a persuasive case would be need to be made to identify 
problems located within the understandings and experiences of communicative 
reflexives, rather than contrary interest-attributions being ungrounded in such 
problems.9   
 
To sum up, it might be useful to return to the four reasons that I gave for evaluating 
Archer’s work on interests.  The first reason was that Archer’s analysis of interests 
was under-appraised, and I have, in response to this, engaged in an assessment 
which suggests that there are serious problems with her approach.  I have suggested 
that Archer’s treatment of structure and interests is unsatisfactory, insofar as it fails 
to sustain her idea that interests are a significant causal influence on the social world 
that can be characterised independently of the understandings of contemporary 
agents.  The second reason was that the notion of interests is closely connected with 
the notion of structure in Archer’s work, and appraising the former helps to give 
some critical purchase on the latter.  Although I haven’t been able to discuss Archer’s 
wider notion of structure in great detail, I have suggested that it may well share the 
problems that were identified with Archer’s account of structural interest.  The third 
                                                 
9
 Archer developed her account of the internal conversation in dialogue with the pragmatist ideas of 
Mead and Peirce, but she clearly intends to offer a realist, rather than a pragmatist, account. 
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reason for engagement was that Archer uses the notion of interests in her empirical 
analysis, and considering this work helps us to assess the value of a critical realist 
approach to empirical research.  In this article I focused particularly on Archer’s 
analysis of communicative reflexives, and suggested that it was unsatisfactory in its 
treatment of the interests of this group.  Of course, this is only one example of 
critical realist empirical work, and so even if the criticisms offered here are accepted, 
we should not be over-hasty in generalizing from the analysis.  Finally, I suggested 
that there is a general social theoretical issue of how best to analyse interests in 
social science, and I have made some positive, problem-solving-based suggestions 
regarding this in the final section.  My claim is that instead of thinking of interests as 
causal influences that may not influence, social scientists are better off thinking of 
interests as characterisations of what it is beneficial for agents to do, and working at 
grasping agents’ conceptions of their interests and identifying problems that these 
conceptions might have.  If problems are identified, social scientists can potentially 
make a positive contribution to the social world by offering solutions that help actors 
to better understand and realize their interests. 
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